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radon causes 7,000 to 30,000 lung cancer deaths per year. The EPA has provided extensive
technical analysis of and support for their recommended policy response of remediating
all homes above a threshold level of radon, but these and other benefit-cost analyses typi-
cally do not consider many important dimensions of household heterogeneity, specifically
residential mobility. We add to the literature on benefit-cost analysis by using agent based
models that allow for heterogeneous benefits. Using this model, we re-examine the EPA’s
recommendations for radon remediation. Since there is both a capital and an annual cost
of radon remediation, many well informed households are better off not complying with
the EPA’s recommendation. We find that most households are better of by not paying the
annual cost of remediation and that only the least mobile households with smokers would
undertake the capital cost of radon remediation in houses with very high radon concentra-
tions. Since only a small fraction of the population values radon remediation, our model
suggests that approximately 10% of the capital cost is likely to be capitalized into the resale
value of the house.
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Abstract
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that exposure to residential
radon causes 7,000 to 30,000 lung cancer deaths per year. The EPA has provided extensive
technical analysis of and support for their recommended policy response of remediating all
homes above a threshold level of radon, but these and other benefit-cost analyses typically do
not consider many important dimensions of household heterogeneity, specifically residential
mobility. We add to the literature on benefit-cost analysis by using agent based models that al-
low for heterogeneous benefits. Using this model, we re-examine the EPA’s recommendations
for radon remediation. Since there is both a capital and an annual cost of radon remediation,
many well informed households are better off not complying with the EPA’s recommendation.
We find that most households are better of by not paying the annual cost of remediation and
that only the least mobile households with smokers would undertake the capital cost of radon
remediation in houses with very high radon concentrations. Since only a small fraction of
the population values radon remediation, our model suggests that approximately 10% of the
capital cost is likely to be capitalized into the resale value of the house.
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1 Introduction
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has termed exposure to residential radon ”probably
the biggest public health problem we have,” causing from 7,000 to 30,000 lung cancer deaths per
year [1]. Since 1986 the EPA has waged a series of publicity campaigns, urging all householders
to test for the presence of radon and to reduce ambient levels of radon when airborne radiation
from radon decay products exceeds 4 picoCuries/liter (pCi/l). [4]. If universally adopted, such a
program would reduce exposure levels in about 5.7 percent of housing units, occupied by almost
5 percent of the population. The EPA has provided extensive technical analysis of and support for
their recommended course of action, including cost-effectiveness analysis [1].
We re-examine the EPA’s recommendations using a model that incorporates much of the im-
portant heterogeneity in the population. We find universal remediation of all houses with ambient
exposure above 4pCi/l (and, possibly, lower levels) would pass a social benefit-cost test. However,
we can imagine no conceivable set of circumstances under which there would be anything like
general compliance with any action level other than an extremely high one, assuming that people
truly understand their individual risk and behave rationally. At 20 pCi/l, for example, an exposure
level that is five times the recommended level for remediation, found in less than .01 percent of
homes, there would not be universal compliance on the part of well-informed households.
The failure of the voluntary action-level approach arises due to the interaction of two phe-
nomena, either one of which would cause difficulty. First, the remediation technology of choice
has both a capital component (sealing, plugging, and installing fans) and an operating component
(running and maintaining the fans). Households that do not expect to be in their houses very long
generally will not be able to recoup the requisite capital investment unless it is capitalized into the
price of the housing unit. (For reasons that we discuss below, we expect capitalization to be much
less than 100 percent of the cost.) We estimate that with normal mobility, between 5 and 15% of
the initial investment will be capitalized into the house price.
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Second, even if operational fans were available in every house that had exposure above any
plausible action level, many well-informed households would choose not to operate the fans, re-
flecting enormous variation in the benefits gained from doing so. The variation in benefits derives
from variation in four important characteristics of households: the age, size, and smoking behavior
of their members, and their subjective valuation of expected life-years saved. Large households
with young smokers will derive relatively large benefits from turning on the fans; small households
of elderly nonsmokers will derive essentially no benefit. Because the remediation technology re-
quires that residents operate the system, only the most inconceivably draconian of regulations
(someone checking to see that the fans are on) could assure widespread compliance with any ac-
tion level.
The implication of our analysis is that policy (and the analysis of policy) must be designed to
take into account residential mobility, the heterogeneity of the population, and the consequences
of radon-remediation technology for individual behavior.
Considering these factors, we conclude that the only way in which general installation of radon-
reduction equipment will be undertaken is via government provision or mandatory regulation. We
also conclude that, depending on the action level and on the distribution of willingness-to-pay per
life-year-saved, a nontrivial fraction of the radon-remediation equipment will not be operated in a
given year. Assuming that households are well informed about the risks, however, allowing them
to choose whether or not to operate the equipment increases, rather than reduces, the efficiency of
policies to deal with the health effects of residential radon.
This paper also adds to the economic literature on willingness to pay for pollution abatement
and the capitalization of environmental amenities in housing values. A large literature use housing
market transactions to examine how various pollution abatement policies such as the Clean Air
Act [3] and Superfund clean-ups [5]. Generally these studies tend to find small changes in housing
values after a relatively large change in environmental quality. In fact, Greenstone and Gallagher
find that Superfund clean-ups “are associated with economically small and statistically indistin-
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guishable from zero local changes in residential property values [and] property rental rates.” [5].
However, our model suggests that this result may not be particularly surprising if there is a high
degree of residential mobility surrounding the clean-up site. Their results may simply reflect a
belief on the nearby residents that the health risk from the polluted areas was sufficiently low if the
exposure time was sufficiently short. Thus, after the clean-up we would expect to see a change in
the rate of housing sales and likely a change in the distribution of ages surrounding a clean-up site.
In the next section we describe the public health and economic models we use to analyze the
costs and effects of reducing residential radon exposure. In section 3 we describe the data we use
to calibrate our models to estimate the behavior of households. In section 4 we discuss the results
and intuition of our simulations and in section 5 we discuss how varying our assumptions affect
the outcomes of the model. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Model
To evaluate radon-reduction policies we construct a model of individual decisions about radon
remediation and mobility. We use an agent based approach where each individual has full infor-
mation about the health effects of the current level of radon in their house, their complete history
of residential radon exposure levels, and their (exogenous) probability of moving out of their cur-
rent house. Furthermore, we assume at the beginning of the simulation that each agent has done
nothing in the past to remediate residential radon in their homes. This is likely similar to the radon
exposure history for most of the US population since there has not been a large scale program to
encourage households to test their houses for radon and to encourage radon remediation.1,2 In the
rest of this section we will discuss the model we use to estimate the health effects of radon ex-
posure, then discuss the options that are available to homeowners who want to reduce their radon
1If some households have installed remediation equipment and then moved, the new occupants would also have to
make the active decision to turn the installed fans on.
2If this assumption fails, it only affects each household’s exposure history of exposure which is not the driving
force in the model.
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exposure, and then the economic model of agents’ behavior.
2.1 Effect of Radon on Health
Epidemiological studies of underground miners have documented that exposure to high levels of
radioactive radon gas can cause lung cancer. The risk of lung cancer from radon can be calculated
as a function of cumulative exposure over a person’s lifetime. Being exposed to a higher con-
centration of radon in any year increases that person’s chance of developing radon induced lung
cancer, though the effect from a radon exposure in a particular year eventually fades over time.
There are strong interactions between radon induced lung cancer and smoking induced lung
cancer. People who are current smokers not only are 22 times as likely to develop lung cancer from
smoking than non-smokers, they are also approximately six times more likely than non-smokers to
develop lung cancer from equivalent levels of radon exposure.
Exposure to residential radon is translated into lung-cancer mortality risk according to the
model described by the Commission on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation of the National
Academy of Sciences [7]. This model is commonly referred to as BEIR VI.
The BEIR VI model estimates the relative risk that an individual faces for radon exposure based
lung cancer as a function of their cumulative radon exposure, age, and if they have ever smoked.
The exact model is specified as:
RR = 1 + (Ψs=1s+ Ψs=0(1− s))(γ1w5−14 + γ2w15−24 + γ3w25+)
where RR is the relative risk of lung cancer from radon, s is an indicator equal to 1 for people
who were ever smokers, wx1−x2 =
∑t−x1
t−x2 wt for radon levels w measured in pCi/l, Ψ is an age and
smoking status specific constant and γ1, γ2 and γ3 are weights used to signify the decreased risk of
radon induced lung cancer as the exposure date fades into a person’s radon exposure history. Table
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1 shows the numeric values for the constants.3
2.2 Remediation Technology
The most prevalent method of remediating residential radon and therefore the only type of radon
remediation we consider in this analysis is Active Slab Depressurization (ASD). ASD involves
two steps. First, fans are installed in order to ventilate the radon trapped in the area below the
foundation slab to the outdoors, while holes in the walls and floors are plugged and sealed. Second,
the fans must be turned on, maintained, and occasionally repaired. Running the fans uses electricity
and also increases the costs of heating a house [1]. Henschel [6] suggests that over 90 percent of
all residential radon remediations use ASD. Initial installation of ASD systems, including testing,
plugging and sealing, involves an average cost of $1200 with a range of $800-$2,500.
Running the fans costs an average of about $125 per year for electricity and increased heating
costs.4 Annualized maintenance and testing costs, assuming testing every five years, come to
another $24. EPA assumes that the whole system lasts for 74 years, at which time it would have
to be replaced. Over the 74-year life of the system, total costs come to $4,244 discounted at 5%.
Note that for any plausible discount rate, the up front costs are small compared to the present value
of the operating, testing, and maintenance costs.5
Provided that the fans are operating properly, ASD generally reduces radon exposure to an
average of 2pCi/l or less, regardless of the initial level of exposure.6 (With only a few exceptions,
3There are a few variants of this model described in the BEIR VI report. We use the same coefficient values as the
EPA so as to make the analysis comparable.
4The EPA estimates a range between $50 and $200. CITE - EPA website:
http://www.epa.gov/radon/pubs/consguid.html
5The EPA’s Technical Support Document [1] has somewhat higher costs, averaging $1684 in upfront costs and
annual costs of $150.75. However, $38.77 of their annual costs is annual radon testing, which we find highly implau-
sible, and many of the more expensive technologies that are averaged into the initial costs are economically dominated
by ASD. Moreover, more other work [6] documents that ASD almost always provides high radon reductions, and
is almost always the method of choice. Thus, we conduct our analysis under the simplifying assumption that all
remediation is done via ASD.
62pCi/l is the average assumed by the EPA in the Technical Support Document [1] and the amount used in this paper
as the average exposure for remediated housing units. The ”or less” reflects Henschel’s remark that ASD ”techniques
provide high radon reductions, as high as 98 to 99+ percent.” [6] Except for a very few houses, such reductions would
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this is true of all of the remediation strategies discussed by the EPA [1] and by Henschel [6]). To
some extent, the post-remediation level of exposure depends on the characteristics of the house,
but only slightly or not at all on the pre-remediation level of exposure.7 The implication for cost-
effectiveness is straightforward: cost is approximately independent of the level of initial exposure,
as is post-remediation exposure. This implies that effectiveness increases almost linearly with the
initial level of exposure, so that cost-effectiveness will generally be greater the greater is the initial
level of exposure. A given reduction in exposure has the same effect on health no matter what the
initial level of exposure, but the higher the initial level, the more reduction can by obtained at a
given cost. Note that this does not imply that only high-radon homes are worth remediating. It
merely implies that the net payoff to remediation is highest in homes with the highest initial levels
of radon.
In the following analyses, we adapt the EPA’s conclusion that remediation will reduce exposure
to an average of 2 pCi/l to the more analytically tractable assumption that all remediated housing
units have exposure levels of exactly 2 pCi/l.
2.3 Behavioral Model
In this section we describe the economic model we use for a household’s decision about whether to
take action to remediate the ambient radon concentration in their house. Our model allows house-
holds to be forward looking about their remediation decisions and allows households to completely
understand the health consequences of their decisions.
Since all residents of a particular household are necessarily exposed to the same radon con-
centrations, our model takes households as the relevant level of analysis. Therefore, we assume
imply post-remediation levels well below 2pCi/l. For our purposes, we accept EPA’s estimate of remediation to 2
pCi/l.
7See Exhibit F-2 of the EPA’s Technical Support Document [1]. The Exhibit shows that the cost of ASD generally
varies with technical characteristics of the building foundation, but for all action levels below 20 pCi/l cost does not
vary with action level. Above 20 pCi/l, only ”Hard to Fix” houses with basements, accounting for 16.5 percent of
houses above 20 pCi/l (about 0.6 percent of houses that would be remediated at an action level of 4 pCi/l) cost more
than other houses that use ASD, and the difference is $221.54 of initial cost.
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that the household maximizes over all members and that the utility of the household is additive
across periods. Thus, a household of two people incur twice the health costs of a household with
one individual. More restrictively, we assume that the household has a particular smoking history
instead of individuals within the household having a particular smoking history. This means that
all adults in a household are current smokers, former smokers, or have never smoked. Moreover,
we assume that all households have two members, both of whom are the same age. Due to this
assumption we further restrict our model to households with occupants aged 20 or older.
We model household behavior assuming that agents have full information about the health
effects of radon exposure according to BEIR VI, the distribution of radon in the current housing
stock, the radon level in their current house, and their complete radon history. Households are
forward looking with respect to their probabilities of leaving their current house and the likelihood
of dying before next period.
At the beginning of each period, a household observes whether or not its current house already
has remediation equipment installed, the radon level in their current house, as well as their age,
smoking status (current smoker, former smoker, or never smoker), and radon exposure history.
After observing all of this, the household can choose whether or not to install radon remediation
equipment in the house and pay the cost of the installation, k, or choose not to remediate the radon.
If a household chooses in install remediation equipment or the house already has remediation
equipment installed, the agent then chooses whether or not to use the remediation equipment. If
the household uses the remediation equipment and pays the associated cost, c, its radon exposure
for that period is assumed to be 2 pCi/l. If it chooses not to use the remediation equipment, its
radon exposure for that period is the ambient radon concentration in the house. See Figure 1 for a
decision tree representing the choices.
The household will move in the next period with some probability, δ. We assume that a house-
hold’s decision to move is independent of its previous choices of purchasing radon remediation
equipment and the concentration of radon in their house. However, if moving is endogenous to
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a household’s decision to remediate the radon in the house, any investment that has already been
made in remediation equipment is a sunk cost and should not influence its decision to move or not
in the current period.
We allow our model to take on different values for the probability of moving, δ, and dying, λ,
for different types of people. We define types of people, θ, by their age, radon exposure history,
and smoking status.
This model leads to two Bellman equations of the form:
V Rθ (r, a, z) = max{operate remediation fans, do not operate remediation fans} (1)
and
V NRθ (r, a, z) = max{install remediation, do not install remediation} (2)
where V Rθ (·) is the value function for people who already have radon remediation equipment
installed in their house and V NRθ (·) is the value function for people who do not already have
remediation equipment installed.
In order to specify what V Rθ (·) and V NRθ (·) look like, we will first need to introduce some more
notation. Each period (assumed to be a year) households get flow utility, u, from their house and
discount the future using discount factor β = 0.95.8 Both residents of each household are the
same age, a and have the same smoking histories, s, (current, former, never smokers). We assume
that no one begins smoking before age 18 and that the distribution of current, former, and never
smokers are the population average for that category at each age. Together, age and smoking status
define a type, θ. Each household type, θ, has an exogenous probability of moving each year, δθ,
and a probability of dying during the year, λθ.
Each household knows the radon concentration of their current house, r, measured in pCi/l, as
well as the distribution of radon in the housing stock, f(r).9 We then define each household’s radon
8This discount factor corresponds to roughly a 5.3% discount rate.
9The density of radon concentrations (before remediation) in the housing stock can be approximated with a log-
9
exposure history as a 25×1 column vector, w = wa, wa−1, wa−t, . . . , wa−25, where each entry is
the cumulative sum of radon exposure up to time a− t. This vector of radon exposure history, w,
along with current radon exposure, smoking status, and age determine the increased probability of
lung cancer from radon exposure, h(r, s, a, w), from the BEIR VI model described above. Once
we multiply the probability of lung cancer by the value of a life-year, we can monetize the risk to
the household. This monetized value allows us to calculate if that household finds it worthwhile to
install and/or operate radon remediation equipment in its house.10
We assume that radon remediation equipment has a capital and installation cost, k, and a yearly
cost of running the fans and extra heating costs, c. We then define the indicator variable, f =
1 if the household chooses to run the remediation fans. With some positive probability, p, if a
household changes houses, that house will already have remediation equipment installed in the
house. In equilibrium, p will be higher for homes with a higher initial radon concentration, but this
doesn’t affect households’ behavior since we assume households’ choose a house independently
of the radon concentration.11
Households that have remediation equipment installed will be able to recoup part of their capital
expenditures on the remediation equipment through an elevated resale value. One of the important
features of our model is that we can estimate both the capitalization of remediation equipment,
π, and the probability that a house will have remediation installed, p in an internally consistent
normal density, with mean 1.25 and geometric standard deviation, 3.11; r ∼ logN(−0.42, 1.13). CITE - (Nero 1986)
10Our central case for the value of a life-year is $300,000. We do a sensitivity analysis by using life-year values
between $100,000 and $500,000.
11This is identical to assuming that households do not sort into houses based on the radon concentration. If instead,
households perfectly sorted into houses based on radon concentrations, we would not expect to see any capitalization
of radon remediation equipment, nor see any remediation equipment installed. The intuition for this is that only those
households that have a low cost of radon exposure will move into high radon houses. Some households will have
a low cost of radon either because the household is old and will not experience the full effect of the current radon
exposure before they die, because it is a non-smoking household and therefore have a smaller health effect of radon
exposure, or because it is a young household that is likely to move again soon. If these three groups of households
with a low cost of radon exposure are not big enough to inhabit all of the high radon houses we would see some
capitalization of remediation equipment. However, the size of the population that falls into one of these three groups
far outweighs the number of houses with a high radon concentration. Because we are assuming household are choosing
houses independently of radon concentrations, we will overestimate the capitalization of remediation equipment and
the fraction of houses that are remediated.
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manner so that households make remediation decisions in part based on these parameters. We will
describe how we solve for these parameters in Section 2.3.2.
Given this notation, we can define V Rθ (·), the value function for households that already have
remediation equipment installed as:12




h(r, s, a, w,E[r′, w′])(1− f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
health cost of not running fans
−h(2, s, a, w,E[r′, w′])f︸ ︷︷ ︸




cost of running fans
+λθ(1− δθ)βV Rθ (r, a′, w′)︸ ︷︷ ︸




′, a′, w′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of moving to a house with remediation
+
λθδθβ(1− p)Er[V NRθ (r′, a′, w′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of moving to a house without remediation
+ (1− λθ)(−∞)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of dying
(3)
and V NRθ (·), the value function for households that do not already have remediation equipment
installed (either because the household has installed it in a previous period or moved into a house
that already had it installed) as:
V NRθ (r, a, w) = max
{(
u− h(r, s, a, w,E[r′, w′]) + λθ(1− δθ)βV NRθ (r, a′, w′)︸ ︷︷ ︸





′, a′, w′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of moving to a house with remediation
+λθδθβ(1− p)Er[V NRθ (r′, a′, w′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of moving to a house without remediation
+









h(r, s, a, w,E[r′, w′])(1− f)−
h(2, s, a, w,E[r′, w′])f
)
− cf − πk + λθ(1− δθ)βV Rθ (r, a′, w′)︸ ︷︷ ︸





′, a′, w′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of moving to a house with remediation
+λθδθβ(1− p)Er[V NRθ (r′, a′, w′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of moving to a house without remediation
+




Note that for any variable x, x′ is next period’s realization of x. The age and smoking specific
12We ascribe a utility value of -100,000,000 to each agent if they die. The function of this term is to induce agents
into pursuing activities that help them avoid death. Our simulation results are robust to a wide array of negative utility
values from dying.
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probabilities of moving, δ, and dying, λ, can be found in Table 2 and Figure 2 respectively. Us-
ing value function iteration we can solve the system of equations and then find each household’s
optimal remediation policy function.
2.3.1 Types of Agents
Our model has three dimensions that define each type of agent: age (between 20 and 110, inclu-
sive), smoking status (current, former, and never smokers), and radon exposure history13 (including
current period unremediated ambient radon level for a total of 26 dimensions). This gives us a total
of 28 state variables to integrate over to solve the model.
In order to solve our model we need to give each of our agents a history of radon exposure.
We first assign an agent to each radon×age×smoking status cells. (This gives us a complete array
of types in the r × a × s dimensions.) We then impute a history, wx, for each of these agents
conditional on finding the agent in that cell, using age specific probabilities of having moved in the
past and the level of radon in the agent’s current house.
For instance, consider a 46 year old smoker who is currently living in a house with a radon
level of 10 pCi/l. With probability 0.907 they were exposed to that level of radon when they were
45 (and with probability 0.093 had a randomly drawn other radon level). When the agent was 44
they were exposed to a radon level of 10 pCi/l with probability 0.773 (=0.907×0.852) from being
in the same house, with probability 0.079 (=0.093×0.852) were exposed to the radon level from
the house they may have moved into when they were 45, with probability 0.134 (=0.907×0.148)
received a new, random radon draw when they were 44 because they moved that period, and with
probability 0.014 received a new, random radon draw when they were both 45 and 44 by moving
two years in a row. The number of possible histories grows exponentially with the number of
lagged state variables (dimension of w). This gives us a total possible number of types of agents
13We use a 50 point grid of evenly spaced radon levels between 0 and 20 pCi/l. We have experimented with
increasing the number of grid points to 100 which has very little effect on our results.
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of (dim(w))(grid size) × dim(age) × dim(smoking status) ' 8 × 1044. This is not a computable
problem given current computing technology.
The typical solution to this problem is to reduce the number of state variables in the model.
However, due to the fact that the BEIR VI model attenuates the effect of cumulative past radon
exposure over 25 years and our assumption of persistence of radon concentrations in a household’s
history, we are not able to condense the number of state variables for the history of radon exposure
concentrations, dim(w).
In order to get around this problem, we sample for the possible histories available in the pop-
ulation and integrate over our subsample of histories (instead of integrating over all possible his-
tories).14 We have run the simulation with a number of historical types15 between 100 and 1,00016
and have found that the results do not seem to be terribly sensitive to the number of historical
types. For completeness, we report the results of the simulations we ran for all numbers of histor-
ical types. Moreover, if people do not actually know their complete radon exposure history, our
simulation is capturing much of the important variation by simply having a high likelihood of the
previous few periods of radon exposure correct since most of the 8 × 1044 variations come from
the exposure “tree” splitting further in the past.17
2.3.2 Calculation of the Capitalization Value of Remediation Equipment
In our economic model of households’ behavior, both the capitalization of remediation equipment
and the probability that an agent moves into a house with remediation equipment already installed
are determined endogenously.18 In order to make these parameters endogenous, after each step in
14We assume that none of our agents engaged in any radon remediation behavior until the date that the simulation
started. Thus our distribution of radon concentrations across agents histories reflect the distribution of radon in an
unremediated housing stock.
15A historical type is a particular moving history for each type (radon×age×smoking status×history). Therefore,
for each historical type we are actually solving the dynamic programming problem for 50×91×3=13,650 types.
16We stop increasing the number of historical types at 1,000 due to computational size since the matrices needed to
be held in memory by the computer reach 1.1Gb.
17Table 3 lists all of the behavioral model parameters with a brief summary of each.
18In order to ensure that our value function iteration converged in under 1,000 iterations, we rounded the capitaliza-
tion percent to the third decimal place.
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the value function iteration, we calculate the proportion of houses that will have remediation and
the probability that each agent will move into that house next period. We assume that agents do not
choose houses based on either the ambient radon level or the existence of remediation equipment at
a particular house. We do not believe this is a particularly restrictive assumption because the value
of other amenities from a particular house are likely to be far greater than the costs of installing
remediation fans. Therefore, in the next step of the value function iteration agents have the correct
beliefs about these parameters and make their decisions accordingly until we find the fixed point.
3 Data
In order to make our model operational, we use data on age specific death rates, baseline lung
cancer rates for current smokers, former smokers, and people who have never smoked.
We also use data from the U.S. Census Bureau on age specific probabilities of moving to inform
our model [8]. From the age of 20 until 84, the probability of moving decreases for each age group,
from a maximum of 35.5% of 20-24 year olds moving every year to a minimum of 4.3% of 65-84
year olds moving every year, with just a slight increase in the probability of moving for people 85
years old and over. All of the probabilities can be seen in Table 2.
We calibrate our model to match the age distribution in the US by using data from the 2006-
2008 American Community Survey [2]. A density plot of this data is shown in Table 3.
4 Results
We present the results of our simulations in Tables 4 and 5. The first line of Table 4 shows the
capitalization percentage for each of our simulations, varying both the value of a life-year and the
number of household radon exposure histories we consider. As mentioned above, our preferred
estimate is from the simulation with 1,000 household radon exposure histories. Within this row,
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the capitalization values vary between 5% and 15% depending on the assumed value of a life-
year. The literature typically considers a life-year to be worth approximately $300,000.Under this
assumption the capitalization value of remediation equipment is just over 10% with 0.3% of houses
having remediation equipment installed in them. To add a little context, if houses with the highest
0.3% of radon concentrations had remediation equipment installed, houses with ambient radon
concentrations of 13.4 pCi/l and above would have remediation equipment installed.19
However, as displayed in Figure 5 we can see there is significant variation in household’s
remediation decisions based on their age and smoking status. Figure 5 shows a contour plot of the
policy functions for a set of agents with the same radon exposure history. Each point on the plot
represents an agent with a particular age and current radon exposure, while holding the agent’s
smoking status and radon exposure history constant. The stalactite-shaped area protruding from
the top of the each of the graphs is the boundary between where an agent chooses to install and/or
run remediation equipment and fans in their house or not.20 The top row of contour plots show the
policy functions for agents who live in houses with remediation equipment already installed, either
because they have installed it in a previous period or because the house they live in had it installed
when they moved in. The bottom row of contour plots show the policy functions for agents who
live in houses that do not already have remediation equipment installed.
We first turn our attention to the bottom row of the contour plots. This row of contour plots
show the policy functions for households who live in houses that do not have radon remediation
equipment already installed. Thus, if they want to influence the concentration of radon in their
house they will need to install the remediation equipment at a cost of $1,200 and then pay the
annual cost of running the fans of approximately $125.
The stalactite in the two right-most figures delineates the age×radon concentration combina-
19A full 7% of the housing stock has a radon concentration above the current EPA recommended action level of 4
pCi/l.
20We also allow for the possibility that an agent would want to install remediation equipment in their house but not
pay the variable cost involved with running the fans. Our simulations suggest that this is never an optimal choice for
an agent.
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tions where households find it worthwhile to install radon remediation equipment and operate it.
The size of the stalactite increases as we move from the left picture in the figure to right picture of
the figure. This shows that never smokers are least likely to install remediation equipment and/or
run the fans and current smokers are the most likely to remediate the radon concentrations in their
house. This fits the fact that the largest health benefits of remediation accrue to current and former
smokers.21
We also see that the very young and very old people tolerate substantially higher radon lev-
els before purchasing or operating radon remediation equipment. These results come from two
different sources of variation. The oldest people in our simulation do not install or use radon re-
mediation equipment because there is no health benefit that accrues to them to offset the cost of
installation or use. BEIR VI models radon exposure as having no negative health implications until
5 years after the year of exposure. Thus, in the limiting case, 105-110 year olds will never have
any adverse health effects of radon exposure since all of our agents are projected to die before they
reach 111 years old. This effect attenuates rather rapidly as we examine the optimal policies of
agents younger than 105. However, this is the effect that is driving the steep slope of the boundary
between the two policies on that side of the contour plot.
On the left side of all of the graphs we see that young people tolerate substantially higher radon
levels before purchasing or operating radon remediation equipment. This is due to the fact that
young people move frequently and therefore will reap very few benefits from installing remediation
equipment. A young person (age 20-24) living in a high radon house has a 1
3
chance of moving
next year whereby they will be living in a house that has an expected radon level of 1.25 pCi/l.
Thus, in expectation, they are likely to have a one or two year spike in their radon exposure which
will be less detrimental to their health than if they were exposed to that concentration of radon
for the next 10 years. However, since the probability of moving falls by over 300% between the
21Though the BEIR VI model does not distinguish between current smokers and former smokers, these two groups
have different baseline levels of lung cancer. These baseline levels drive the difference in actions between the two
groups.
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ages of 29 and 45, we also see that the incentive to install and/or operate remediation equipment
increases dramatically with age.
Tables 4 and 5 display the trough point for each of contour plots (averaged across all radon
history types). We see that the trough generally occurs around the age of 50 with an action level
greater than 5 pCi/l depending on the smoking status of the household. These households are the
most likely to directly benefit the most from their investment in remediation equipment since they
only have a 1 in 10 or 1 in 15 chance of moving in an particular year. Thus, the capitalization
value of the remediation equipment plays a substantially smaller role for these households than
the younger households. Moreover, these households are likely to live long enough to capture the
most of the health benefits of reducing their radon exposure.
We now turn our attention to the top row of contour plots in Figure 5. This row shows the con-
tour plot of the policy functions for households who live in houses that already have remediation
equipment installed. This means that in order to decrease the radon concentration in their house,
these households only need to pay the cost of operating the fans, approximately $125. Unsurpris-
ingly, younger households with houses that have lower concentrations of radon operate their fans
than if they also needed to install them. In fact, we see that never smokers between the ages of 40
and 60 who have houses with extremely high concentrations of radon find it worthwhile to operate
the remediation equipment in contrast to never smokers without equipment already installed.
These simulations all assume that there is no sorting on radon concentrations in the housing
market. To the extent that the housing market is efficient at sorting people such that those with
the lowest willingness-to-pay for radon reduction (in the extreme, mobile, nonsmoking elderly)
tend to find the highest-exposure houses, there would be essentially no capitalization, even at high
levels of exposure. Perfect sorting of this kind would also obviate radon exposure as a policy
problem, because exposure would do relatively little damage. Even imperfect sorting, which we
would expect to see in the housing market, would further reduce capitalization, thereby weakening
the incentives for households to install remediation equipment.
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5 Discussion of Policy Implications
We have identified two reasons why, if people are well-informed and behave rationally, an EPA-
style policy is unworkable. Only one if these – the positive externality associated with installing
remediation equipment – is realistically amenable to policy intervention. The second reason is
that many households will choose not to operate a remediation system. If people are rational and
well-informed as in our model, however, this is not really a policy problem at all, provided that
households who would derive net benefits from operating radon remediation equipment live in
residences that have remediation installed. The reason for this is straightforward: if well-informed
households choose not to operate remediation systems, there is no market failure; we can infer that
operating the systems would not be cost-beneficial.
There is no public (and virtually no private) health problem if a household consisting of elderly
nonsmokers chooses not to operate the fans. Given any household’s value of a life-year, if cost per
life year saved in that household exceeds its value, economic efficiency is enhanced when the (well-
informed) household chooses not to run the fan. The marginal savings exceed the marginal benefit.
Thus the public health problem presented by residential radon involves inducing the installation
(and repair) of ASD systems, not the operation of such systems.
Of course, if households are in some combination irrational or ill-informed, this straightforward
theorem from revealed preference is not applicable. We speculate on these possibilities later in this
section, but retain for now the assumption that homo economicus is deciding whether or not to turn
on the fans.
The positive externality from installation of radon remediation equipment can be dealt with
through a regulatory strategy, through public provision of radon remediation equipment, or by
providing monetary incentives for private provision. Public provision of remediation equipment
or providing monetary incentives essentially changes the capitalization value of the equipment in
our model. Public provision of remediation equipment would correspond to a 100% subsidy with
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partial monetary incentives resulting in an increased capitalization percentage. At an action level
of 4 pCi/l (the EPA’s guideline), public provision of remediation equipment to 6,000,000 eligible
housing units at a cost of $1,200 each would cost approximately $7.2 billion. It seems unlikely, in
the current political climate, that such expenditure would be undertaken publicly. Private monetary
incentives would also involve budget costs. Such incentives would also be very ineffective in the
short run, given our estimate that over four-fifths of eligible households at any given time would
obtain no surplus from having access to a remediation system - that is, they would not even turn
on the fans.
Notice that even if the remediation equipment is completely paid for by the government, many
households with radon concentrations above 4 pCi/l would not operate the equipment. This can
be observed since a complete subsidy is identical (in our model) to all households already having
remediation equipment installed (These policy functions are displayed in the top row of Figure 5).
Never smokers rarely operate the fans and even many former smokers do not find it worthwhile to
operate the fans. Our simulations suggests that the only subpopulation that is likely to operate the
fans at the EPA’s guideline of 4 pCi/l are middle aged smokers.
5.1 Alternative Scenarios
Up to this point we have only considered models where all households had complete informa-
tion about the health effects of radon exposure, the capitalization of an investment in remediation
equipment, and their probability of moving. We now consider two variants of the models.
The first variant of our model we consider is a situation where investment in remediation equip-
ment is not capitalized into the housing value at all. If our model is incorrect to assume that every
one has full information about the health effects of radon (as it likely is), we are also likely to mis-
estimate the capitalization of remediation. If the population systemically underestimates their risk
of radon induced lung cancer, our capitalization estimates will be too high. In the limiting case,
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where the population either assumes the have no risk of radon induced radon lung cancer or have
no knowledge of the risks (and therefore assumes there is none) there will not be any capitalization
of remediation equipment. The contour plot of household’s policy functions in this scenario are
shown in Figure 6.
These policy functions look quite similar to those from the baseline scenario where there is full
information about the radon health costs.22 The stalactites are slightly smaller than the baseline
scenario but there is little difference. This is a result of the fact that capitalization in the baseline
scenario is approximately 10%, so even when fully informed, households are already bearing most
of the capital cost of remediation.
The second variant of our model we consider is a situation where our households never move
from the house they currently occupy. While this situation is clearly not something that would
occur, most cost benefit analyses assume that all of the benefits of remediation equipment accrue
to the current homeowner. In this situation, the externality associated with the installation of
remediation equipment is internalized because the household will not move and receives all of the
benefit of the remediation equipment. In this model we assume that households have moved at the
average probabilities before the simulation begins, but then once made aware of the risk of radon,
never move again.
The policy functions shown in Figure 7 come from this model.23 We can see that more house-
holds choose to install remediation equipment, particularly among younger cohorts. The substan-
tial increase in installation among younger cohorts is due to the fact that they have a shorter radon
exposure history and have the most to gain if they do not move in the future. We also see that,
even at high levels of radon a substantial proportion of the population will not install remediation
equipment, notably all households that have never smoked.
22Clearly, only the decision of installing remediation equipment is affected by forcing the capitalization of the
investment to be zero. If there are already remediation equipment in the house, the households decision does not
change.
23Again, this change to the model will not have any effect on households decisions to operate the fans once they are
installed, so the top row of contour plots do not change.
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5.2 Information Requirements
To be effective, the ”realistic” policy approach discussed in this section requires that householders
be well-informed about the radon-related risks that they face and about the effectiveness of radon
remediation systems in reducing that risk. A regulation requiring that remediation systems be
installed will have no health benefits unless households turn on the fans. Our analysis assumes that
households have sufficient information to make that decision.
Making such information generally available will surely require a costly public information
campaign. Implicitly, the analysis that we have conducted here supposes that such a campaign
would be inexpensive relative to the costs of remediation themselves (a reasonable assumption)
and effective (an assumption that may or may not be reasonable). Thus, before pursuing any policy
of public provision or subsidization of remediation equipment we would propose extensive test-
marketing and experimentation of advertising protocols. The object would be to see what fraction
of households, at what costs, would become well-informed about the costs and consequences of
operating radon remediation systems. Note that if households systematically believe that such
systems are substantially less effective than they are, a policy that promotes general availability of
such systems will fail to meet a benefit-cost test. Thus the marketing research that we call for here
is a fundamental prerequisite of a successful remediation policy.
Subsequent to such a study, it would be possible to reliably predict who would operate the
systems were they available, and thus to reliably evaluate the policy of ”remediate on transfer” that
looks so promising based on the rational-behavior analysis we have reported here.
6 Conclusions
Because of mobility, remediation of residential radon exposure has all the earmarks of a classic
public health problem: the benefit to the community of installing remediation equipment consid-
erably exceeds the benefit derived directly by those members of the community undertaking the
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requisite action. Our results suggest that mobility could be a very significant barrier to reducing
residential radon exposure because much of the initial investment in remediation equipment is not
likely to be capitalized into housing prices. Our simulations suggest that in the case that everyone
is well informed about the healths risks of radon exposure, approximately 10% of the initial invest-
ment will be reflected in the resale price of the house, and only about 0.3% of houses would have
remediation equipment installed.
Assuming that households are well-informed about the health risks associated with radon ex-
posure, our simulations suggest that very few households will find it in their best interest to follow
the EPA’s guideline to install remediation equipment at a concentration of 4 pCi/l or above. How-
ever, if the remediation costs are heavily or completely subsidized, an action level between 4 and 6
pCi/l is justified for both current and former smokers, though households who have never smoked
are unlikely to find it worthwhile to operate remediation equipment even if capital costs are fully
subsidized.
In the absence of a capital subsidy, very few households will find it worthwhile to install and
operate remediation equipment. Our simulations suggest that among former smokers only house-
holds between the ages of 40 and 60 in houses with a radon concentration above 12 pCi/l will
install remediation equipment. The among current smokers, the age range approximately doubles
to 30-85 years old and the required radon concentration falls to approximately 8 pCi/l. Most strik-
ingly, households who have never smoked will never find it worthwhile to install radon remediation
equipment at any concentration of radon less than 20 pCi/l or age.
Our simulations suggest that there is important dimensions of heterogeneity both across ages
and smoking histories to consider when designing a policy toward residential radon. While previ-
ous studies have examined the aggregate costs and benefits of a homogeneous policy our results
suggest that a targeting of policy at subpopulations, particularly smokers, would increase the ben-
efit cost ratio substantially.
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7 Tables




Ψs=0 if age< 55 0.1536
Ψs=0 if 56 <age< 65 0.0876
Ψs=0 if 66 <age< 75 0.0446
Ψs=0 if 76 <age 0.0138
Ψs=1 if age< 55 0.06912
Ψs=1 if 56 <age< 65 0.03942
Ψs=1 if 66 <age< 75 0.02007
Ψs=1 if 76 <age 0.00621










Source: US Census Bureau
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Table 3: Parameters of Economic Model
u Flow utility from housing
s Smoking status (current, former, or never smoker)
a Age (20-110)
r Radon concentration, before remediation, in current house (0-20)
w Vector of 25 years of cumulative radon exposure
f Indicator variable =1 if fans are operated in current period
c Cost of operating the fans for 1 period; $125
π Capitalization of remediation equipment into housing value, endogenously determined
k Cost of installing remediation equipment; $1,200
θ Denotes a “type”; unique combination of (s,a,r,w)
λθ Probability of dying this period for type θ
δθ Probability of moving next period for type θ
β Discount factor; 0.95
p Probability that the next house has remediation equipment installed, endogenously determined
Table 4: Capitalization and Prevalence of Remediation Equipment
Value of a Life Year
$100,000 $200,000 $300,000 $400,000 $500,000
Capitalization (Percent) 4.0 7.9 9.5 12.3 12.7
Percent of Housing Stock with Remediation 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.006
Table 5: Peak Age and Radon Levels for Remediation Decisions
Value of a Life Year
$100,000 $200,000 $300,000 $400,000 $500,000
Houses with Remediation Equipment Already Installed
Non-Smokers - Age − − 50.1 49.7 49.5
Radon Level − − 18.3 14.2 11.8
Former Smokers - Age 49.7 48.8 48.2 47.1 48.9
Radon Level 14.7 8.3 6.2 5.2 4.5
Current Smokers - Age 48.8 45.9 43.8 42.1 43.7
Radon Level 7.5 4.8 4.0 3.6 3.2
Houses without Remediation Equipment Already Installed
Non-Smokers - Age − − − − −
Radon Level − − − − −
Former Smokers - Age − 45.8 47.4 45.6 45.3
Radon Level − 18.0 12.4 9.6 8.0
Current Smokers - Age 41.8 45.6 46.3 45.3 45.2
Radon Level 14.6 9.0 6.6 5.3 4.8
25
8 Figures
Figure 1: Decision Tree for Households
Figure 2: Probability of Dying before reaching the next age
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Figure 3: Density of Ages in the United States, 2006-2008
Figure 4: Density of Radon Concentrations in an Unremediated Housing Stock
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Figure 5: Policy Function for a Typical Household’s Remediation Decision with a Life-Year Valu-
ation of $300,000
Figure 6: Typical Policy Function for a Household’s Remediation Decision with a Life-Year Valu-
ation of $300,000 if There is No Capitalization of Remediation Equipment
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Figure 7: Policy Function for a Household’s Remediation Decision with a Life-Year Valuation of
$300,000 if the Household Will Never Move
29
